Why do some civil conflicts end quickly, while others last for years? This paper argues that an incumbent government's military forces play a crucial role in conflict duration. Specifically, "combined arms" militaries -which bring to bear a mixture of mechanized infantry, armor, and aircraft -make short conflicts more likely. The use of mechanized ground forces in combination with airpower increases the likelihood of decisive engagements early in a conflict, helping to mitigate information asymmetries that can drive violence. By contrast, less-mechanized forces have greater difficulty bringing the fight to the enemy. Combined arms militaries therefore tend to bring conflicts to more rapid conclusions. However, like maneuver warfare in conventional interstate conflict, these outcomes are not always favorable for the incumbent governments. To test this argument, we employ new, detailed data on military mechanization and airpower from civil conflicts between 1967 and 2003. The results indicate that national militaries with high combined arms capabilities are associated with significantly shorter conflicts. Perhaps surprisingly, this relationship remains robust even when the analysis is limited to insurgencies.
Introduction
One of the most puzzling characteristics of intrastate conflicts is that some last for days, while others last for years. This wide variation distinguishes civil conflicts from interstate wars: the longest interstate war during the past two centuries lasted 11 years, whereas conflicts in Colombia, Myanmar, and elsewhere have persisted for decades. At the same time, some civil conflicts end quickly. It took just eight months for rebels to defeat the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, in part due to intervention from Western airpower. Yemen crushed a 1994 separatist movement in a mere two months without outside assistance, confounding widespread expectations of a lengthy stalemate. Most civil conflicts, in fact, last less than two years. What explains this dramatic variation?
This paper examines the role of military technology in explaining the duration of civil conflicts. Specifically, it evaluates how mechanization -that is, a military's relative reliance on airpower, armor, and vehicles versus manpower -can influence the likelihood that a conflict will reach a rapid conclusion. National militaries vary widely in the degree to which they rely on mechanized forces. Some militaries consist almost entirely of manpower, while others possess vast fleets of aircraft, armored vehicles, and tanks. How does this variation shape the nature of conflict? Do highly mechanized militaries bring about quicker resolutions to military conflicts, or do they prolong them by precluding decisive victories?
We argue that mechanized militaries can bring about more rapid resolutions to civil conflicts. Incumbent governments that can draw on a diverse military portfolio of mechanized infantry, armor, and aircraft -"combined arms" in military parlance -tend to fight significantly shorter conflicts than those that do not. Our conclusion derives from an information-centric theory of conflict termination. Military conflicts often arise from information asymmetries: that is, disagreements among the combatants about which side is stronger or more resolved (Fearon 1995) . These disagreements arise because military strength depends not only on observable material capabilities, but also on a variety of unobservable, intangible factors (Biddle 2004) . To end a conflict, information asymmetries must be mitigated -typically, by decisive battles that reveal each side's true fighting ability. Combined arms forces help facili-tate these battlefield engagements early in conflicts, leading to more rapid resolutions. First, their superior mobility and logistics allows them to reach conflict zones more quickly, thus minimizing the time lag between the onset of a conflict and a decisive military engagement.
Second, the combination of airpower and mobile ground forces helps prevent opponents from retreating and regrouping. Instead of merely scattering rebel forces during an attack, government forces are more likely to engage them, increasing the likelihood of an informative military result. Third, combined arms operations require a significant level of effort, quickly exposing a military's material capabilities, organizational competence, and resolve. A military's ability to effectively execute its strategy therefore becomes more quickly apparent when it employs a combined arms approach, compared to less-demanding doctrines.
In short, combined arms militaries facilitate decisive battles that allow combatants to learn -and agree -about the true balance of power and resolve, thus enabling quicker settlements to civil conflicts. Combined arms militaries are not necessarily more likely to win these conflicts, but their unique features do make it more likely that a verdict will be reached rapidly.
To test this theory, we employ a new dataset containing detailed information on the military manpower, armored vehicles, tanks, and combat aircraft of states embroiled in civil conflicts. A series of survival models and logistic regressions provides evidence that military mechanization is correlated with shorter conflicts -but only when mechanized ground forces and airpower are combined. This result holds even after accounting for factors such as national wealth, external assistance, geography, and other factors that influence the duration of conflicts. Perhaps most surprisingly, the effect of combined arms remains robust even when we limit our analysis to insurgencies.
These findings help advance the study of conflict in two key ways. First, they contribute to a growing literature that seeks to understand why and when civil conflicts end (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Cunningham 2006; Buhaug et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012) . Understanding the duration of civil conflicts is important in part because longer conflicts tend to be much more costly. This study examines the question of duration from a military angle, emphasizing the role of weapons technology in explaining why civil conflicts end -or fail to end.
Second, this paper adds to a growing body of research about the role of military technology in armed conflict. A variety of studies have recently argued that explaining the nature and outcomes of violent conflicts -both within and among states -requires that we understand the military forces and strategies employed by combatants (e.g., Biddle 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) . While there is a fair amount of agreement that mechanization is likely to yield short, sharp, and decisive interstate wars (e.g., Bennett and Stam 1996) , the effect of mechanization on intrastate conflicts is less clear. Further, the debate on military mechanization has tended to emphasize the effects of military technology on the outcomes of conflicts -especially insurgencies.
1 This paper adds a new dimension to the debate, demonstrating that mechanization carries important consequences for the duration of conflicts as well. By introducing the concept of combined arms, this paper demonstrates the need for continued innovation in how we conceptualize and measure force structure.
The paper proceeds in four parts. The first section explains combined arms warfare and discusses its impact on civil conflict duration. It then derives several explicit hypotheses about the effects of mechanization and combined arms. The second section describes our data on combined arms and our empirical approach to modeling duration. The third section presents results from a series of event-history models and logistic regressions. The final section offers conclusions and discusses implications for future research.
Military Technology and Civil Conflict Duration
Explanations for the duration of civil conflicts tend to cluster into three broad groups. The first group of theories emphasizes rebel capacity for sustaining the fight and evading government attack. Factors such as material capabilities, rebel strategy, and external supporters play a central role in these explanations. Several studies, for example, have found that military capabilities (Cunningham et al. 2009; Hultquist 2013) Buhaug et al. 2009; Bleaney and Dimico 2011) .
3
A second body of research points to the role of information problems in explaining conflict duration. Like many interstate wars, civil conflicts often arise -and persist -because the combatants disagree about their relative power or resolve (Fearon 1995) . Information problems are particularly acute in the early stages of conflicts, when combatants are poorly informed about their opponents' capabilities (Walter 2009: 250) . The existence of multiple factions and outside actors can exacerbate the problem, making information about combatants difficult to obtain and quickly obsolete (Cunningham 2006; Nilsson 2008) . Governments face further challenges collecting information on rebel groups operating in remote regions, across borders, or within large sympathetic populations (Salehyan 2009 ). All of these factors make information problems difficult to ameliorate, thereby impeding the resolution of conflicts.
Third, scholars have highlighted the importance of commitment problems in explaining civil conflict duration. When the parties to a civil conflict cannot credibly commit to upholding a peace deal after it is signed, according to this view, termination will be very difficult to achieve without a decisive victory by one side (de Figueiredo, Jr. and Weingast 1999; Walter 2002) . Settlements may be elusive if rebel groups expect that the government will grow stronger over time and eventually renege on the deal (Fearon 2004) . This may explain why ethnic wars in particular tend to be longer-lasting (e.g., Kaufmann 1996; Collier et al. 2004; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012 ).
2 Humphreys (2005) , however, finds that natural resources are associated with shorter wars. 3 For a contrary view see Rustad et al. (2008) .
Mechanization and Air Power: Prescriptions for Stalemate?
Together, the literature on civil conflict has painted an extensive picture of the geographic, economic, and political factors underlying civil conflict duration. While seizing or defending territory is an important goal in these conflicts, obtaining and preserving support from local populations is even more critical.
Stalemate on the Ground
The received wisdom holds that the unique characteristics of intrastate conflicts lend themselves poorly to mechanized warfare. Krepinevich (1986) famously blamed the American quagmire in Vietnam on the U.S. military's vehicle-and firepower-intensive doctrine, which was unable to achieve decisive results against North Vietnamese guerrillas. 4 Several influential studies (e.g., Lyall and Wilson 2009; Lyall 2010) have since concurred that mechanized ground forces are ill-equipped to achieve rapid, decisive victories in unconventional conflicts.
5
One key reason is that mechanized ground forces are poorly suited for collecting infor-4 See Caverley (2010) for a review of the debate surrounding U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam.
5 For dissenting views, see Smith and Toronto (2010) and MacDonald (2013) .
mation about local allies and adversaries, especially in urban settings (Lyall and Wilson 2009 ). In intrastate conflicts -and particularly counterinsurgency campaigns -recruiting informants and identifying enemy collaborators among the local population are key objectives, since enemy personnel may be disguised among local inhabitants rather than waiting in uniform on the battlefield. Non-mechanized infantry forces tend to be more integrated into the local population, since they are not protected by vehicles and depend more on local sources for food and supplies. As a result, they are better positioned to enmesh themselves into local networks and accumulate information about the enemy.
Mechanized armies, by contrast, tend to be more isolated from local populations and subject to "information starvation" (Lyall and Wilson 2009: 68) . With advanced transportation and logistics, mechanized troops depend more on external supply lines for provisions, which in turn reduces interaction with the local population. Mechanized forces also tend to be garrisoned on separate bases, furthering their estrangement. The upshot is that mechanized armies have lower levels of information about enemy locations and must therefore choose between using violence indiscriminately (and losing the support of the local population) or allowing enemy combatants to operate with relative impunity. Neither of these options is conducive to quick resolution.
At the same time, according to this argument, mechanized forces are difficult to defeat outright. Mechanized forces tend to be stationed away from urban areas on well-protected bases that are difficult for rebels or insurgents to destroy. While limiting contact with local populations can inhibit an army's ability to collect information, it has the advantage of bolstering force protection by minimizing troops' exposure to potential guerrilla attacks.
Moreover, mechanized forces are highly mobile and therefore better able to evade or escape from perilous engagements than their non-mechanized counterparts. These advantages make it difficult for rebel forces to quickly impose costs on government armies; instead, they must bleed the enemy gradually over time.
Mechanized ground armies, in short, are less likely to achieve outright victory but are also more difficult to defeat. If this logic is correct, we should observe civil conflicts involv-ing mechanized ground armies lasting longer, on average. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Civil conflicts involving highly mechanized government ground forces will be longer, on average, than conflicts in which a government's ground forces are not highly mechanized.
Stalemate in the Air
A related perspective suggests that militaries that rely primarily on airpower face similar challenges in bringing civil conflicts to an end. Kocher et al. (2011) and Lyall and Wilson (2009) suggest that the problems of information starvation, civilian casualties, and alienation of local populations also characterize airpower-intensive strategies. Pape (1996: 74) Hypothesis 2. Civil conflicts involving militaries with a high proportion of combat aircraft will be longer, on average, than conflicts in which a government's air forces are limited.
Mechanization and Civil Conflict: A Revised Perspective
Existing research on military technology in civil conflicts has tended to examine ground mechanization and airpower in isolation. 8 However, this approach offers an incomplete picture of how these weapons can be used by incumbent governments to fight rebels. We argue that the interaction of a government's airpower and mechanized ground forces -in other 6 Pape notes, however, that bombing may be able to assist interdiction campaigns against rebel supply lines.
7 Even the most vocal proponents of airpower in unconventional settings acknowledge the need for ground support. See, for instance, Andres et al. (2006) and Dunlap (2008) , who discuss the role of airpower in support of counterinsurgency ground operations.
8 An exception is Lyall and Wilson (2009) , who include helicopter usage in their analysis of mechanization.
words, its "combined arms" capability -encourages rapid decisions in ways that each platform in isolation does not. In this section, we describe the basic components of combined arms doctrine, and explain why they tend to shorten civil conflicts.
Combined Arms in Theory and Practice
While the term "combined arms" can encompass a wide variety of strategic and tactical variations, central to all of them is the integrated use of multiple combat platforms to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Mechanized ground forces and airpower each offer features that the other cannot, mitigating the independent limitations of each type of force when used in tandem.
Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery offer superior mobility, firepower, force protection, and the ability to seize and hold ground. Patrolling aircraft simply cannot target enemy combatants on the ground with the same scale, immediacy, and degree of precision as nearby vehicles. Airpower also cannot take and hold territory by itself. Aircraft, however, offer their own unique advantages: fixed-wing transports and rotary aircraft can deliver soldiers to remote areas more rapidly -and more safely -than ground vehicles, and they can bring more firepower per vehicle to decisive points on the battlefield. Airborne assets also perform reconnaissance, communication, and command and control functions that ground units cannot. Perhaps most importantly, close air support can quickly prepare a battlefield for an armored assault by destroying large weapons and disrupting enemy positions.
Reflecting on the lessons of World War II, Omar Bradley observed that "the air-armor team is a most powerful combination in the breakthrough and in exploitation" (U.S. Army 1945: 61), and modern militaries have tended to follow his prescription. The U.S. Army's famous "AirLand Battle" doctrine of the 1980s, for example, envisioned integrating armored ground units with aggressive airstrikes designed to disrupt the enemy's ability to reinforce its lines and coordinate a defensive response.
9 According to this doctrine, "arms and services complement each other by posing a dilemma for the enemy. As he evades the effects of one weapon, arm, or service, he exposes himself to attack by another" (U.S. Army 1986: 25) .
In conventional interstate wars, the integrated use of mechanized ground forces and airpower is thought to favor quick and decisive battlefield outcomes. Indeed, that is frequently the explicit objective: combined arms doctrines aggressively employ maneuverable ground and air forces in "blitzkrieg" offensives to pursue rapid knockout victories (Mearsheimer 1983; Stam 1996; Kier 1997) . Airpower and mechanized ground forces are critical to these operations, which rely foremost on speed and mobility. And as Stam (1996: 52) notes, maneuver strategies tend to result in wars that end quickly: decisive engagements occur early in the war, so "rapid success or failure becomes apparent." Bennett and Stam (1998) found that the maneuver strategies enabled by combined arms doctrines produced more rapid decisions in interstate wars -although not necessarily more favorable outcomes.
While the combined arms approach to warfare was originally designed for conventional combat at the interstate level (House 2001: 77-81) , it is also frequently applied in intrastate conflicts. 10 One obvious reason for this is that many civil wars are fought conventionally.
Conflicts triggered by territorial separatist movements or intra-army fractures lend themselves to fights involving armor, well-trained and organized armies, and direct battlefield engagements. According to Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) , roughly one-third of all civil wars since 1944 -and half of those beginning after 1990 -have been primarily conventional conflicts.
The role of combined arms in intrastate conflicts, however, has not been limited to strictly conventional wars. Indeed, they have also played an important role in several recent counterinsurgency campaigns. In the first Chechen War, for example, Russian forces employed an integrated air and ground doctrine, incorporating elements of attrition and maneuver warfare to isolate and destroy rebel forces (Toft and Zhukov 2012) . After a failed initial assault on Grozny, in early 1995 the Russians reorganized their "forces into small mobile assault groups, made better use of snipers and heavy artillery, and made sure that units talked to each other and to air assets, so that mutual support was possible" (Oliker 2001: 24) . The result was a brutal but rapid conquest of the Chechen capital, paving the way for a negotiated settlement that had appeared improbable at the war's outset. When Chechen forces invaded Dagestan three years later, the Russians returned to Grozny and neighboring towns with an even more intensive combined arms approach (Johnson et al. 2008: 114-23) , using "massive artillery and air strikes followed by dismounted forces. . . artillery, tanks, surface-to-surface missiles, attack helicopters, and bombers" (Oliker 2001: 78) .
The Russian example also demonstrates that while a maneuver warfare campaign is the classic quick and decisive operation, combined arms can also be used to support other strategies (Mearsheimer 1983: 105-12; Biddle 2004: 18-19 ). In the case of both Chechen conflicts, Russian forces delivered massive amounts of firepower quickly to central rebel strongholds (with little regard to civilian casualties).
Combined Arms and Conflict Duration
Military conflicts occur when two sides fail to reach a bargain that resolves their dispute without fighting. Bargaining failures, in turn, often arise from disagreements about the balance of power. If the combatants disagree about which side is more powerful, they may hold incompatible views about what a fair bargain looks like and thus be unable to locate a settlement that satisfies both parties (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009 ). Such disagreements emerge because the "true" balance of power is difficult to observe without actually fighting.
The ability of a government or rebel group to prevail in battle depends not only on material factors such as weapons and troops, but also on intangible factors such as training, strategy and doctrine, troop discipline, leadership, and skill. While combatants typically have reliable information about their own abilities, they are usually much more uncertain about those of the other side.
A key function of military conflict, then, is to reveal information: combat outcomes serve as a common metric of military strength, helping to mitigate disagreements about the balance of power. 11 They allow combatants to discover the actual balance of power and facilitate their ability to locate a settlement that both sides can accept. A rebel group, for example, may discover that it is weaker than expected, and sue for peace. Alternatively, the government may experience unexpected setbacks that make a settlement appear more attractive. Either way, factors that favor large-scale, decisive engagements early in a conflict will be associated with shorter conflicts. Early engagements allow the combatants to quickly learn about the capabilities of the other side, laying bare each side's true fighting ability (Weisiger 2013) . By contrast, campaigns involving small, scattered skirmishes with irregular fighters will last longer because they provide fewer opportunities to expose this information.
Combined arms doctrines help facilitate decisive early engagements in four key ways.
First, the enhanced mobility of a mechanized army enables it to attack distant enemy strongholds quickly, thereby reducing the chances that rebels in remote locations will be able to draw out a conflict simply because they are difficult to reach. Conflicts featuring mechanized government forces therefore are less likely to feature long periods of low-intensity fighting, since government forces are better able to locate and strike the enemy. The integration of airpower with ground forces also enables incumbent forces to supply operating bases in enemy territory, further bolstering its ability to press the fight (Read 2010) . In Colombia, for example, farc insurgents have been able to successfully coordinate insurgency activities since the 1960s in part because their location -largely in remote, rural areas -has insulated them from attacks by the poorly-equipped Colombian military.
Second, combined arms strategies help prevent rebels from retreating and prolonging conflicts. The combined employment of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and close-air support enables rapid strikes against elusive rebel targets that might otherwise scatter or retreat. Airpower is an essential component here, working in tandem with motorized ground forces to help incumbent governments flush out, surround, and contain enemy forces (Biddle 11 Note, however, that information is not always a sufficient condition for conflict termination. As Fearon (2004: 290) observes, "after a few years of war, fighters on both sides of an insurgency typically develop accurate understandings of the other side's capabilities, tactics, and resolve." Even with complete information, he argues, commitment problems can still preclude peaceful settlements. See also Fearon (1995) ; Sechser (2010); Powell (2012). 2003). In Algeria during the 1950s, for example, France employed more than 800 fixed wing aircraft alongside a well-equipped General Reserve of parachutists and mobile Foreign Legion forces to attack enemy concentrations before they could disperse (Alexander and Keiger 2002; Griffin 2010 ).
Third, combined arms operations are extremely demanding from an organizational perspective. The purpose of combined arms is to deliver a high level of concentrated violence in a short period of time. To achieve this, however, militaries must be not only well-equipped but also possess a high level of training, leadership, and coordination. One implication of this fact is that combined arms doctrines expose ineffective militaries rapidly. Less-demanding strategies -attempting to overwhelm the enemy with sheer manpower, for example -take longer to achieve their intended objectives, so it takes time to assess their effectiveness.
High-tempo, combined arms strategies, by contrast, quickly reveal a military's ability (or inability) to execute. As a result, they more rapidly resolve information problems -specifically, disagreements about relative power of the combatants -that inhibit peaceful settlements.
By contrast, when used in isolation, airpower and mechanized ground forces are unlikely to produce these same effects. Airpower alone can rapidly deliver firepower to targets, but because aircraft cannot take and hold territory, air operations without ground support carry a greater risk of allowing the enemy to scatter and retreat (Corum and Johnson 2003: 425-28) . Mechanized ground forces, for their part, can more effectively cut off enemy lines of retreat, but they cannot reach the battlefield as quickly, nor do they benefit from the degree of real-time intelligence and reconnaissance that airpower offers. In isolation neither delivers the incumbent's maximum effort in a rapid fashion.
The hypothesis that follows from this logic therefore is:
Hypothesis 3. Civil conflicts involving government military forces with both a high degree of airpower and ground force mechanization will be shorter, on average, than conflicts in which government forces lack these capabilities.
Combined Arms in Civil Conflicts: Illustrations
Combined arms strategies have been used in a variety of civil conflicts during the last halfcentury. Below we discuss four cases that illustrate the effects of combined arms in civil conflicts. In the first case (Yemen), government forces employed a combined arms doctrine from the beginning and brought the conflict to a rapid conclusion. The second case (Nigeria) offers a contrasting example of a military that failed to adopt a combined arms strategy and consequently fought a longer war than necessary. The final two cases (Sri Lanka and Chad) illustrate how the adoption of a combined arms doctrine in the midst of a conflict can help end fighting.
Yemen, 1994
The Republic of Yemen was only four years old when the southern portion broke away to declare the Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1994. Unionist forces counterattacked quickly, employing an aged but relatively mechanized force of roughly 80 aircraft, 1,500 tanks and armored vehicles, and 40,000 ground troops. The government's campaign began on May 4, 1994 with a four-column offensive. The widely-dispersed columns quickly cut the southern territory in half, and then converged on Aden from three directions. After a two-week siege of the city, Aden fell on July 7, confounding widespread predictions of a long stalemate (Ayalon and Maddy-Weitzman 1994).
The Yemen episode illustrates how the use of combined arms can yield rapid and decisive results in a civil conflict fought with conventional weapons and tactics. The mobility of northern forces was critical in enabling government troops to seize territory, maintain long supply lines, and force decisive engagements during the first weeks of the war (Kostiner 1996: 80-81) . Indeed, the war lasted just two months, an outcome that would have been unthinkable if the government had lacked the ability to quickly press the fight against rebel forces.
Nigeria, 1967-70
Unlike Yemen in 1994, the Nigerian military found itself ill-equipped to suppress a rebellion when the region of Biafra broke away in June, 1967 . At the outset of the conflict, Nigerian forces had no working combat aircraft, tanks, or heavy artillery. As a result, the Federal government was slow to react to Biafra's declaration of independence, and the military missed key opportunities to put an early end to the conflict. After a surprise rebel strike into Nigeria's midwest in August 1967, the Biafran army found itself overextended and in hostile territory. If the Nigerian army had been more mobile, according to one general, it could have ended the war then and there simply by cutting Biafran supply lines and surrounding enemy units (Obasanjo 1980) . Instead, Biafran troops were able to outrun Nigerian forces and regroup.
Recognizing this deficiency, within a few months the Nigerian military obtained several Soviet MiG fighters and Czech Delfìn light attack planes. These were joined by IL-28 bombers in early 1968 (Brown 1968: 25-26) . However, these aircraft were rarely employed in tandem with ground forces as close air support; instead, they were used to bombard key occupied towns in advance of ground offensives (Barua 2013: 19) . Furthermore, the Federal air wing engaged in indiscriminate bombing and strafing of civilian targets, often with large numbers of civilian casualties. The use of airpower alone may have prolonged the war: although it was soon apparent that the numerically-superior Federal military would eventually defeat Biafran forces, Biafrans were encouraged to fight on by fears that the Nigerian military was planning a genocide.
Lacking the hardware and doctrine necessary to employ combined arms, Nigerian operations during the conflict were the antithesis of rapid and decisive. Ground vehicles played little role in combat and were kept well behind the front lines (Samuels 1969: 19; de St. Jorre 1972: 279) . One observer describes Federal operations during the war as featuring "slow, cautious probes, and long distance bombardments of doubtful object with doubtful accuracy," punctuated by "aimless and wasteful shooting" (Cervenka 1971: 51) . Furthermore, the army's poor logistics and lack of mobility hindered its resupply operations, causing delays of several months between major engagements. The result was a "plodding war of attrition" (Stafford 1984 ).
After two years of stalemate, however, the Nigerian military gradually surrounded Biafran territory, ultimately imposing a suffocating blockade that caused widespread famine. Biafra capitulated in January 1970. Although the conflict ended decisively, Nigeria's inability to employ integrated air/ground operations weakened its ability to end the war quickly, allowing the outnumbered Biafrans to resist until they were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
Sri Lanka, 1983 Lanka, -2009 In the early 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) launched an insurgency campaign against the Sri Lankan government, seeking autonomy for the nation's ethnic Tamils. For years, the government struggled to quell the insurgency, and the ltte seized more than 15,000 square kilometers of territory -nearly a quarter of the country. But in 2009, to "collective global surprise" (Hashim 2013: 6) , the government achieved a crushing victory, in part due to its adoption of combined arms tactics. Speed, not Victory: Georgia, 1992-93
As these examples suggest, militaries with extensive combined arms capabilities are likely to fight shorter civil conflicts. However, this logic does not necessarily imply that combined arms militaries are more likely to win these conflicts. Maneuver strategies are quick and decisive, but risky. They require extensive training and close coordination between air and ground forces, and can fail if not employed correctly (Stam 1996) . Brevity and victory do not necessarily go hand in hand.
The case of Georgia in the early 1990s offers a useful illustration of this distinction. In the database we describe below, Georgia during the early 1990s boasted the highest combined arms score of any civil conflict incumbent since 1967. In 1992 and 1993, the Georgian military fought an unsuccessful campaign to suppress the separatist region of Abkhazia. The conflict began with a swift, violent Georgian invasion into the disputed area. The operation petered out within weeks, however, in part because Georgia could not sustain its long lines of communications, and it ran out of resources to keep its mechanized forces forward-deployed.
In July 1992, the Georgian army received an installment of armaments from Russia as part of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security. This consisted, by one estimate, of several hundred tanks and armored combat vehicles, 100 fixed-wing aircraft, and 50 attack and transport helicopters (Baev 1996: 117) .
12 When Abkhazia declared independence later that month, the Georgian military launched an invasion of the Abkhazian city of Sukhumi using its newly acquired weapons (Cheterian 2011: 187) . Conducting what one analyst describes as a blitzkrieg, the Georgian force took Sukhumi in just two days (Baev 2003: 138) . But this ambitious mechanized thrust also exposed fatal Georgian weaknesses. The Georgian force exhibited poor discipline and little coordination, with different units operating independently and often for personal profit through banditry (Cheterian 2011: 194) . Moreover, the operation exposed the Georgian military's lines of communication, which came under attack by the so-called "Zviadist" militia (named for ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia), a rebel group operating in areas between Abkhazia and Tbilsi (Cheterian 2011: 192-93 ).
The pivotal battle for Gagra in October 1992 illustrates the risk of overextension in combined arms warfare. The Georgian military's tanks and armored vehicles, in addition to air support from SU-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, allowed it to occupy this strategic town with a considerably smaller force than its enemy (Billingsley 2013: 152) . But the Abkhazian force was able to regroup, and using their own ex-Soviet heavy weapons, launched a surprise attack, which quickly cut off and then destroyed the Georgian force. The Georgian military did not mount another offensive operation for the remainder of the war (Billingsley 2013 ). In 1993, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze settled with Abkhazia, allowing Abkhazia to remain effectively autonomous.
In short, the Abkhazia conflict illustrates the double-edged nature of combined arms operations in civil conflicts: the conflict lasted just over a year, but ended in failure for the heavily-mechanized Georgian military. Georgia's mechanized capabilities allowed it to mount a rapid offensive immediately upon Abkhazia's declaration of independence, but its lack of training and experience in employing such a strategy led to a rapid defeat. It is important to note that Georgia's combined arms strategy was not the key reason for its loss.
Georgia's military problems stemmed from vulnerable supply lines and poor troop discipline, neither of which were rooted in its use of combined arms. Indeed, Georgia's success in using the same strategy to defeat the Zviadist rebels during this period suggests that doctrine alone was not responsible for its defeat against Abkhazia. The role of combined arms in this conflict therefore was not to alter the eventual outcome, but rather to bring about that outcome more quickly: combined arms facilitated rapid engagements that exposed Georgia's weaknesses early on, leading to a shorter conflict.
Data and Research Design
Our analysis utilizes an adapted version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset, v. 3-3005 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) . 13 The unit of analysis in this dataset is the conflict-13 These data have been adapted for duration analysis by Gates and Strand (2004) ; we obtained these data from Buhaug et al. (2009). year. The dependent variable in the analysis is the duration of intrastate conflict, measured in days. According to the UCDP coding rules, conflicts are included in the dataset if they reach twenty-five deaths in a single year.
14 The data set overall contains 147 unique intrastate conflicts (excluding coups), all of which began between 1967 and 2003. 15 The duration of these conflicts ranges from a low of one day (three conflicts) to a maximum of 9,380 days, with a mean of 1,710 days.
Measuring Mechanization and Combined Arms
The explanatory variable of greatest interest to this study is the use of combined arms by government militaries. As we discuss below, we measure combined arms by evaluating the possession of hardware (armored vehicles and aircraft) rather than examining each military's fighting doctrine in each conflict. While there is precedent for using a military's material capabilities as a proxy for doctrine (Reiter and Meek 1999: 374-75, Biddle 2004 : 160), we nevertheless acknowledge that our hardware-based measurement is likely to be an imperfect proxy. We choose this route because directly coding an incumbent state's doctrine is not only highly subjective, but also can be done only after the war has concluded, introducing the risk of retrospective bias. Moreover, there are significant barriers to acquiring data on the battlefield employment of forces, particularly in smaller conflicts from decades past.
Measuring the degree to which a military can employ a combined arms doctrine requires data on the doctrine's two material requirements: mechanized air and ground forces. First, we obtained data on national stockpiles of armored ground vehicles (including main battle tanks, heavy armored combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting 14 If our argument is correct, combined arms militaries can result in very brief conflicts, often ending before they escalate to drawn-out wars. A higher fatality threshold (say, 1,000) would risk excluding many of the briefest conflicts, thereby preventing us from observing the full effect of combined arms doctrines. For this reason, a low fatality threshold is more appropriate (e.g., Nilsson 2008; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Buhaug et al. 2009; Østby et al. 2009; Cunningham et al. 2009; Cunningham 2010 ). Following Buhaug et al. (2009: 556) , we consolidated conflicts involving the same actors and locations into a single conflict, so long as they were not separated by more than two years of inactivity. Countries experiencing civil conflicts tend to lie toward the bottom of the mechanization scale, compared to the rest of the world. Sechser and Saunders (2010) found that the average mechanization rate worldwide between 1979-2001 translated to just over 2 armored vehicles per 100 soldiers. In our dataset, however, the mean value of ground mechanization during the same period translates to less than 0.7 vehicles per 100 soldiers. Since military 16 The data collected by Sechser and Saunders (2010) contains ground mechanization information for all odd-numbered years from 1979-2001. Using the same sources and procedures, we extended the dataset's temporal range and collected data for even-numbered years, resulting in a dataset of annual ground mechanization rates for most civil conflict combatants between 1967 and 2003. 17 Note that vehicles belonging to marine or naval infantry units are included in the count of armored vehicles. We follow Sechser and Saunders (2010) in excluding personnel and vehicles belonging to strategic nuclear forces, paramilitary forces, domestic police forces, and reserves from these measurements.
18 In such a regression, β = 0.513, with a standard error of 0.033. The predicted values in Figure  1 were derived from this regression. mechanization is strongly associated with economic wealth (Sechser and Saunders 2010) and conflicts are much more common in poorer countries (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003) , it is perhaps unsurprising that these countries exhibit lower levels of mechanization when compared to their less conflict-prone counterparts.
The central explanatory variable in the analysis below is combined arms. This variable is calculated by interacting ground mechanization with aircraft mechanization.
The resulting variable ranges from a value of 8.2 (Myanmar, 1991 -94) to 60.3 (Georgia, 1991 , with a mean of 29.1 and median value of 27.0. This variable provides the central test of the hypotheses outlined in the previous sections: on one hand, our theory expects that aircraft and ground mechanization in isolation lengthen conflict duration; on the other hand, it also expects that the interaction of these two types of mechanization -combined arms -leads to shorter conflicts.
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As Table 1 By contrast, incumbent governments have stronger incentives to throw the full weight of their military capabilities against incipient rebellions. Since our measurement of combined arms is based on observed holdings, our index is likely to more accurately represent the military strategies of incumbents rather than interveners. We therefore focus on the capabilities of incumbent states rather than third-party interveners. Measuring and assessing the nature of interveners' military forces, however, will be a crucial task for future research.
Control Variables
We include several additional variables that may be relevant to the duration of civil conflicts (as well as our combined arms independent variable). First, we include several measures of a conflict's geographic proximity to the incumbent's capital, including the distance , 1967-2003. between the capital and the conflict zone (Buhaug and Gates 2002 ), a variable denoting conflicts fought along international boundary lines (Buhaug et al. 2009) , and an interaction between the two terms. Second, we measure the material capacity of rebel groups, drawing on data from Cunningham et al. (2009) to measure rebel fighting capacity as well as the relative strength of rebel forces. Third, we include an indicator for the presence of lootable resources such as diamonds and gemstones, illicit drugs, and petroleum deposits in the conflict zone (Lujala et al. 2007; Lujala 2009; Gilmore et al. 2005; Buhaug and Lujala 2005) . Fourth, we control for rough terrain with a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if the conflict zone in question was covered by either 60% mountainous terrain or 60% forested terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug et al. 2009 ). Fifth, democracies may have a tendency to capitalize to minimize casualties (Caverley 2014) . We therefore employ the Scalar Index of Polities (sip) (Gates et al. 2006) , which contains a measure of regime type on a scale of 0 to 1. Sixth, we include GDP per capita both because wealthier governments tend to fight shorter conflicts (e.g., Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) and because scholars also have identified GDP as one of the most reliable predictors of military mechanization (Sechser and Saunders 2010) . GDP therefore is not only an alternative cause of conflict duration, but also a potential confounding cause of military mechanization. By controlling for this confounding factor, we aim to determine whether military technology exerts an effect on conflict duration independent of its relationship to overall military capacity. Seventh, we account for external assistance from third-party governments to the incumbent government and rebels (Cunningham et al. 2009 ). Finally, we include dichotomous variables denoting "sons of the soil" civil wars (Fearon 2004) , civil conflicts fought during the Cold War era, and insurgencies and irregular conflicts (Lyall and Wilson 2009 ).
Estimation Techniques
We employ two approaches to estimating the effect of combined arms on conflict duration. First, we utilize Weibull accelerated failure-time regressions in which combined arms is a central independent variable; second, we estimate a series of logistic regressions with time-dependence controls. Both are standard approaches to assessing the duration of civil conflict. 20 Because countries in the UCDP data can experience multiple conflicts at the same time, all of our regressions employ robust standard errors clustered on country.
Results Table 2 presents the results of a battery of Weibull hazard models designed to estimate the effect of mechanization and combined arms on conflict duration. 21 To check the robustness of these findings, we re-estimated the models in Table 2 using a Cox proportional hazards model, a semi-parametric model which uses less restrictive assumptions than the Weibull model. The results were virtually identical. Matters change, however, when we evaluate the interactive effect of ground and air mechanization. Hypothesis 3 argues that even if these two types of mechanization prolong conflicts when employed independently, their simultaneous use can have the opposite effect. This hypothesis expects that states employing combined arms should fight shorter conflicts, on average, than those employing just one form of mechanized force. The regressions in Table   2 provide consistent support for this view: in each of the eleven models, the coefficient for combined arms is negative and statistically significant at the 95% level or above, indicating that the use of armored ground vehicles in tandem with airpower may be able to reverse the independent effects of each type of mechanization.
As a robustness check of these results, Table 3 presents a series of logistic regressions with conflict termination as the dependent variable. The regressions are specified identically to those in Table 2 , with the exception that three time-dependence variables are included in the models to control for duration. 22 The substantive results are consistent with those in Table 2 : while independent measures of mechanization are associated with longer conflicts, the combination of ground and air mechanization is associated with a higher likelihood of conflict termination.
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To illustrate the substantive impact of combined arms, Figure 2 plots three-dimensional surface of the predicted probability that a civil conflict will terminate in a given year, as the three mechanization variables vary. 24 First, the graph illustrates the conflict-lengthening effects of air or ground mechanization for states that score low on both measures. Consider, for example, a state that begins with an unmechanized ground force and a small air force, thus falling toward the near-left corner of the figure. Bolstering the state's ground mechanization alone -thus moving it toward the near-right corner -reduces the likelihood that the conflict 22 Specifically, the variable time measures the number of days a conflict has been ongoing at the time of observation. The variables time 2 and time 3 were then included as well (Carter and Signorino 2010) . Coefficients are not reported in Table 3 , given their lack of theoretical importance.
23 Note that the substantive interpretation of logit coefficients in Table 3 is opposite that of Table  2 : negative coefficients in Table 3 signify factors that reduce the likelihood of war termination, whereas positive coefficients indicate factors associated with shorter conflicts.
24 This figure was generated using coefficient estimates from Model 12 in Table 3 . will end at any given point, resulting in longer conflicts on average. Likewise, adding air power without mechanized ground forces -thus moving from the near-left to the far-left corner -also results in longer conflicts. In isolation, both air and ground mechanization therefore are associated with longer conflicts.
Matters change, however, when mechanized ground forces are combined with airpower.
At high levels of each mechanization variable, increases in the other mechanization score are associated with a higher probability that a conflict will end. For example: for a state that already possesses a mechanized ground force (toward the near-right corner of the chart), adding air power (moving toward the far-right corner) results in an increased probability of conflict termination. The reverse is also true: adding mechanized ground forces to a military with ample air power has a similar effect. This supports the combined arms hypothesis:
if aircraft are combined with highly mechanized ground forces, the state will be better positioned to force a rapid decision one way or another on the battlefield. The upshot is that combined arms doctrines lead to shorter civil conflicts, whereas unevenly mechanized forces lengthen them.
The analysis yields several other interesting results as well. Consistent with the findings of Rustad et al. (2008) and Buhaug et al. (2009) , distance exerts a strong effect on conflict duration. Conflicts fought far from a nation's capital, as well as those fought along international borders, tend to last longer, on average.
Equally interesting are three factors that do not reliably impact civil conflict duration in our analysis. First, conflicts fought on forested or mountainous terrain do not appear to last longer: although the rough terrain variable achieves 95% significance in one regression, this result does not survive alternate model specifications or estimators. Indeed, this finding is in line with several other studies that also found rough terrain to be unrelated to civil war duration (e.g., Collier et al. 2004; Rustad et al. 2008; Escribà-Folch 2010; Bleaney and Dimico 2011) . Second, democracies do not seem to fight shorter wars: incumbent democracy does not achieve statistical significance in any of the regressions, echoing the findings of Fearon (2004) ; DeRouen and Sobek (2004); and Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) . Third, the findings are mixed with respect to the presence of lootable resources -oil, drugs, and gemstones -in the conflict zone. In some regressions, lootable resources appear to be associated with longer wars, but this result is not robust.
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Combined Arms and War Outcomes
As we have noted, the theory presented in this paper is a theory about the effects of military technology on the duration of civil conflicts -not their outcomes. Whereas the debate about military mechanization has focused primarily on whether mechanized militaries win or lose (Lyall and Wilson 2009; Smith and Toronto 2010; Friedman 2011; MacDonald 2013) , our interest is in whether such militaries fight longer conflicts. Nevertheless, the outcomes of 25 Other studies have also found inconclusive evidence regarding the impact of lootable resources. A somewhat more consistent finding is that oil exerts little systematic effect on civil war duration, which could be driving the mixed findings here (Collier et al. 2004; Escribà-Folch 2010; Bleaney and Dimico 2011; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) .
conflicts can offer some insight into the logic of our argument. In particular, the logic of Hypothesis 3 implies that militaries using combined arms should be neither more nor less likely to prevail in their conflicts. Using combined arms may force an earlier verdict in a conflict, but not necessarily a more favorable one. Table 4 puts this hypothesis to the test, using logistic regressions to examine the relationship between military mechanization and the likelihood of either an incumbent victory (Models 23 and 24) or a rebel victory (Models 25 and 26). Because the UCDP dataset does not code conflict outcomes, however, we turn to Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) , who code outcomes for all civil wars in the UCDP dataset involving at least 1,000 fatalities.
26 If combined arms is reliably associated with either victory or defeat for the incumbent government, this would suggest that the logic described in this paper is at best incomplete, and that combined arms strategies have either more strengths or weaknesses than we have acknowledged.
The results in Table 4 , however, suggest that this is not the case. Models 23 and 24
indicate that mechanization is a poor predictor of incumbent victory: states with high mechanization scores are neither consistently more nor less likely to prevail in civil wars.
Likewise, in the second set of models, the three mechanization variables exhibit no reliable correlations with rebel victories in civil wars. This evidence suggests that both victories and defeats are responsible for the observation that mechanized militaries fight shorter conflicts.
A combined arms strategy is no guarantee of victory in intrastate combat.
Combined Arms and Insurgencies
While these results demonstrate the importance of combined arms in the broad category of civil conflicts, not all intrastate conflicts are alike. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) demonstrate that civil conflicts may be fought as conventional set-piece battles, peasant revolts, or urban insurgencies. The mode of combat -and therefore the utility of mechanized military forces -may vary widely across different types of conflicts. Insurgencies in particular may pose special challenges to mechanized militaries, since fighting often occurs house-to-house rather 26 The analyses also include the same control variables used in Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) . than in open battlefields. Insurgencies therefore represent the "hard cases" for combined arms warfare. Do the effects of combined arms hold for insurgencies as well? Table 5 evaluates this question by estimating two of the regressions in Table 2 against a sub-sample of only insurgencies. 27 The results suggest that combined arms have duration effects not only in conventional civil wars but also in counterinsurgencies. Consistent with Lyall and Wilson (2009) , the coefficient for mechanization is positive and statistically significant at the 99% level or above in both regressions, indicating that incumbent states with
27 The other six model specifications used in Table 2 yield similar results. These models are not reported here to avoid unnecessary repetition. mechanized ground forces but little airpower fight longer insurgencies. But when combined with airpower, the effect of mechanized ground forces is reversed: the coefficient for combined arms in Table 5 is negative and achieves statistical significance at the 95% level in both models. The overall conclusion is that combined arms doctrines are strongly associated with shorter civil wars -even insurgencies.
Implications and Conclusions
This article has evaluated the role of military technology in explaining the duration of civil conflicts. While conventional wisdom holds that mechanized land armies tend to produce lengthy, indecisive stalemates, we have argued that the opposite effect may obtain when mechanized ground forces are combined with airpower. The simultaneous, coordinated use of land-based armor and combat aircraft -known as a combined arms doctrine -can create the conditions for more rapid, decisive battlefield outcomes, leading to shorter conflicts.
Using fine-grained data on the military forces of incumbent states, we evaluated this claim by conducting a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between military technology and civil conflict duration. There were three key results. First, we found support for Lyall and Wilson's (2009) finding that mechanized ground forces favor stalemate rather than victory. Secondly, we found evidence that airpower alone is likely to extend civil wars.
Third, and most importantly, the analysis revealed that using mechanized ground forces in conjunction with airpower can offset these effects. States that combine airpower with mechanized armies tend to fight shorter -not longer -civil conflicts.
These results offer an important revision to our understanding of military mechanization in intrastate conflicts. While mechanized ground forces indeed appear to suffer serious limitations against nonconventional opponents, as Lyall and Wilson (2009), Lyall (2010) , Friedman (2011) , and others have found -our findings suggest that the addition of airpower may help states overcome some of these limitations. Ground force mechanization on its own may be problematic, but militaries that use armored vehicles in combination with com- bat aircraft fight shorter wars, on average, than militaries that rely strictly on ground-force mechanization. While our analysis focuses on incumbent states rather than third-party interveners, these findings may offer a warning to policymakers against precipitously reducing the role of armor and airpower in counterinsurgency operations.
At the same time, this study leaves two important questions unanswered. First, although conflicts involving combined arms militaries may be shorter, this does not mean that they are less costly. Indeed, Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) provide evidence that since the Cold War's end, civil wars have grown shorter but more destructive. Further research is needed to determine the effects of combined arms on both military fatalities and civilian collateral damage. Even if combined arms yield shorter conflicts, those conflicts may be no less devastating than their longer, low-intensity counterparts.
Second, as noted earlier, shorter civil wars do not necessarily imply more successful civil wars for incumbent governments. It could be the case that combined arms militaries are more likely to achieve quick victories -but they may also be more likely to suffer rapid losses. Additional research could help isolate the connections between the outcomes of civil conflicts -particularly non-insurgencies -and military technology.
In general, our study points to the need for more fine-grained data about military capabilities and doctrine in civil wars. Although our analysis utilizes new and detailed data on the weapons stockpiles of civil war combatants, raw stockpile data does not indicate how these weapons were used in combat. New data on the military doctrines of civil war incumbents would permit a more direct assessment of combined arms operations in these conflicts. On a similar note, our study accounts only for the mechanization levels of incumbent governments, not rebel groups. Yet, as several studies have demonstrated, there is wide variation in the military strategies employed by rebels and insurgent groups. Many such groups utilize armor and even airpower. New data about how rebels fight would help researchers better specify the effects of military technology on the duration and outcomes of civil wars.
Most broadly, the findings of this study underscore the importance of incorporating military technology into our theoretical models of civil conflict. Explaining the dynamics of intrastate conflict requires understanding how the technology of warfare interacts with geographic, economic, and political factors to shape battlefield events and political decisions.
Further investigation into the role of military technology is likely to yield new insights both for researchers interested in explaining costly conflicts, and for policymakers interested in preventing them.
